

Advancing the Scientific Understanding of Trust and Culture in Negotiations

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Abstract

Trust plays a crucial role throughout the entire negotiation process, and culture adds more complexity to the meaning, functions, and dynamics of trust in negotiations. We take a modest step to provide some insights on trust and culture in the context of negotiations and envision what opportunities are ahead of us in this area. Specifically, we provide a “cognitive map” based on the collective wisdom in the extant negotiation literature and focus on raising important questions about six key culture-related issues that warrant future research: (a) the meaning of trust, (b) the effects of trust, (c) trust development, (d) trust and distrust, (e) trust repair, and (f) trust in virtual negotiations.

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Whenever people engage in joint decision-making to distribute resources, resolve conflicts, or (re)define interdependence, they are negotiating (Walton & McKersie, 1965). In one of the best-selling practitioner-oriented books on negotiation, *Getting to Yes*, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) argued that “if there is mutual trust and confidence in one another’s reliability, negotiations are likely to be smoother and more successful for both parties” (p. 179). Likewise, Lewicki and Polin (2013) considered trust to be “a critical element throughout a negotiation, as both the lubricant that enhances and facilitates the negotiation process, and the binding element that often holds deals together” (p. 29).

Trust refers to an individual’s willingness to accept the vulnerability of others based on the individual’s positive expectations about the others’ conduct (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). The key role that trust plays throughout the entire negotiation process was recognized by Deutsch (1949, 1958) over half a century ago. In recent decades, negotiator trust has become more and more important, as negotiation researchers place greater emphasis on relationships (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006) and increasingly adopt an open-systems perspective (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Individuals come to the negotiation table with their preexisting propensity to trust most others (or strangers; e.g., Yao, Zhang, & Brett, 2017); they develop their perceptions of their counterpart’s trustworthiness and their own trust and act accordingly in the process of a negotiation (Campagna, Mislin, Kong, & Bottom, 2016; Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014); and they rely on trust for the

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postnegotiation implementation of agreements as well as for future cooperation (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Mislin, Campagna, & Bottom, 2011). Accordingly, negotiation researchers have devoted increasing attention to the topic of trust (Brett, Gunia, & Teucher, 2017; Kong, Lount, Olekalns, & Ferrin, 2017).

Building, enhancing, and repairing trust in intracultural negotiations (between parties from the same culture) are presumably difficult, let alone doing so in intercultural negotiations where negotiators have disparate mental models and approaches guided by their own cultures (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Brett & Okumura, 1998). Yet, the current literature has merely provided a fragmentary view of intercultural trust development, which is problematic, as intercultural negotiations between business people, companies, and governments occur frequently in the globally interdependent world economy. Negotiators need to overcome cultural boundaries to build, enhance, and repair trust. As Gibson, Maznevski, and Kirkman (2008) noted, culture always matters, and we need to identify the circumstances under which it matters in the relationship between trust and negotiation.

In this article, we summarize current knowledge and identify a myriad of research opportunities at the interface of trust, negotiation, and culture. We propose a trust-centered conceptual framework (“cognitive map”) based on the collective wisdom in the extant literature, which delineates the role of trust in the three negotiation phases: prenegotiation, negotiation, and postnegotiation (see Figure 1). There are different research issues regarding trust in each of these phases. Next, we discuss six key issues, which are related to the three negotiation phases presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Conceptual framework of trust and culture in the three phases of negotiation.

Six Key Issues about Trust and Culture in Negotiations

The Meaning of Trust

Is the meaning of trust culturally universal or specific? The answer is equivocal (cf. Dietz, Gillespie, & Chao, 2010), particularly in the negotiation context where the meaning of trust tends to vary across cultures. We discuss this issue in terms of the three interrelated forms of trust: interpersonal trust (also known as trust intentions or willingness to risk), perceived trustworthiness (also known as trust

perceptions or trustworthiness perceptions), and trust propensity (also known as generalized trust; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). These issues closely pertain to the phases of prenegotiation and negotiation in Figure 1. Based on Rousseau et al.'s (1998) interdisciplinary definition, interpersonal trust (intentions) should have the same meaning in intra- and intercultural negotiations. That is, the notion that negotiators decide whether they will accept their vulnerability or the perceived risk in the relationship based on their expectations of their counterpart's positive intention or conduct should be qualitatively similar across cultures. This provides researchers with a common ground to compare and contrast negotiators' trust intentions across cultures.

Perceived trustworthiness seems to be most frequently examined in research on negotiator trust (Kong et al., 2014; Lu, Kong, Ferrin, & Dirks, 2017). However, perceived trustworthiness can vary qualitatively across cultures, despite some cross-cultural similarities. Although Mayer et al. (1995), based on their substantial literature review, proposed ability, benevolence, and integrity as the three major factors of trustworthiness (known as the ABI model), researchers have found other trustworthiness factors that are unique and meaningful in specific cultures. Wasti, Tan, Brower, and Önder (2007), for example, found that the items of perceived integrity were interpreted identically across the United States, Turkey, and Singapore, whereas the items of perceived ability and benevolence were not interpreted identically across the three countries. Although "the trustworthiness characteristics of ability, benevolence, and integrity appear to be universal determinants of trust," "there are also additional emic aspects of trustworthiness, at least in some countries" (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010, p. 65). Tan, Wasti, and Eser (2007), for instance, found that Turkish individuals considered identification, humility, and closeness to be trustworthiness indicators, whereas Chinese individuals considered delegation, humility, and closeness to be trustworthiness indicators (cf. Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Notably, the ABI trustworthiness characteristics seem to be valued to different extents in different types of culture; for example, although individualists value more about others' ability and integrity in bestowing trust, collectivists place greater emphasis on others' benevolence (Branzei, Vertinsky, & Camp, 2007). Such systematic cross-cultural differences in the determinants of trust pose challenges on trust formation and cooperation in intercultural negotiations and thus warrant further research.

Trust propensity, or individuals' general disposition to trust most others, also varies across cultures. Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007), for example, "believe that one of the ways in which culture affects trust is through the propensity variable" (p. 351). Does trust propensity directly predict negotiators' trust? The answer to this question is not quite as obvious as one might think. According to the World Value Survey (2014), 60.3 percent of the Chinese respondents indicated that most people could be trusted, whereas only 34.8 percent of the American respondents did so. Yet interestingly, some negotiation studies have shown that American negotiators show a higher level of interpersonal trust (manifested by their behaviors) than Chinese negotiators in intracultural negotiations (Aslani et al., 2016; Graham & Lam, 2003; Lee, Yang, & Graham, 2006; Liu & Wilson, 2011). These findings suggest that (a) trust propensity in the negotiation context is distinguishable from interpersonal trust and (b) the relationship between levels of negotiator trust propensity and interpersonal trust may not be straightforward despite Schoorman et al.'s (2007) claim that culture can influence interpersonal trust through trust propensity. Importantly, as Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011) noted, people in different cultures may construe "most people" differently in their reporting of trust propensity. Therefore, the meaning of trust propensity, particularly in the negotiation context at zero or little acquaintance, may have qualitative differences across cultures.

The Effects of Trust

How does trust influence negotiation processes and outcomes? This question is closely related to the negotiation phase in Figure 1. Kong et al.'s (2014) meta-analysis addressed this question regarding the effects of interpersonal trust. Specifically, they found that trust led negotiators to engage in integrative

behaviors such as information sharing and to disengage from distributive behaviors, and in turn, integrative behaviors promoted joint gains, whereas distributive behaviors promoted individual gains (Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980).

However, are these effects of trust on use of negotiation strategy equivalent across cultures? The answer to this question may hinge upon whether trust is necessary for negotiations in various cultures. Kong et al.'s (2014) findings merely suggest that interpersonal trust can be an important factor that influences negotiation processes and outcomes, but does not suggest that interpersonal trust is the only important factor that does so. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) argued that instead of relying on trust, negotiators can rely on assurance, which is based on their knowledge of an incentive structure surrounding their relationship with their interaction partners. In certain cultures, negotiators may rely largely on assurance; thus, they may not need to develop trust in the first place, and even when they do develop trust, they may not need to rely on trust as a guide to their behaviors.

Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver (2006) and Gelfand et al. (2011) proposed the concept of cultural tightness versus looseness to differentiate between cultures that impose strong norms and sanctions to control individuals' thoughts and actions and those that encourage individuals' free expression of personal preferences. Most published studies on trust and negotiation were conducted in loose cultures (e.g., the United States), but in tight cultures (e.g., Japan), negotiator trust may not be needed for interpersonal cooperation and value creation (Brett et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2017). Instead, negotiators in tight cultures may rely more on assurance in enacting cooperative or integrative behaviors (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Gunia et al.'s (2011) research sheds some light on this issue.

Does interpersonal trust have the same effects on distributive and integrative negotiation behaviors in tight versus loose cultures? Or does cultural tightness-looseness serve as a boundary condition on the relationship between trust and use of negotiation strategy as proposed by Brett et al. (2017)? In addition, if cultural tightness-looseness means that negotiators from tight cultures rely more on assurance (vs. interpersonal trust) and negotiators from loose cultures rely more on interpersonal trust, what happens when one negotiator is from a tight culture and the other is from a loose culture (e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998)? Does cultural tightness-looseness explain why intracultural negotiators tend to leave less value on the table than intercultural negotiators?

Even among loose cultures, some are high-trust cultures whereas others are low-trust cultures (Fukuyama, 1995). For example, although the majority of Western European cultures are loose cultures, some cultures such as Denmark and Finland are higher-trust cultures than France and Portugal (<https://ourworldindata.org/trust>). When a Danish negotiator meets a French negotiator, do they bring their different levels of trust propensity to the negotiation table? Or does their mutual cultural looseness facilitate trust development at the negotiation table? How do their different levels of trust propensity but common cultural looseness influence their negotiation processes and outcomes? For example, trust incongruence due to cultural differences can potentially inhibit open information sharing and joint problem-solving, thereby precluding value creation (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2009), but cultural looseness may facilitate trust development at the negotiation table.

Trust Development

Despite the accumulated knowledge about trust, we have largely adopted a static approach to investigate the antecedents of trust in negotiations (Lu et al., 2017), rather than a dynamic (longitudinal) approach to investigate trust development (cf. Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006) in negotiations. Lu et al.'s (2017) meta-analysis found that both trustor attributes (positive affect, negative affect, and social motives) and shared attributes (prenegotiation relationship, small talk, communication medium, and

cultural tightness–looseness) play critical roles in predicting interpersonal trust in two-party negotiations.¹ Nevertheless, trust represents an individual's psychological state at a certain time point, and thus, it can fluctuate over time. What is the pattern, trajectory, or mechanism of trust development in negotiations? This question pertains to all three phases of negotiation presented in Figure 1.

Lewicki et al. (2006) and Lewicki and Stevenson (1997) proposed that an agenda for trust development research should examine both the quantitative change in the level of trust and the qualitative change in the nature of trust. We concur with Lewicki et al. (2006) that it would be important to better understand both the quantitative and qualitative changes in trust. However, we would like to point out that studying quantitative change in trust requires the potentially dubious assumption that trust can be conceptualized as a unidimensional construct. Yet, even with this assumption, there is a question regarding the baseline. Do negotiators develop their trust from zero in intracultural negotiations? Perhaps no. What about intercultural negotiations? Some level of trust is likely to exist even in a meaningless interaction (Jones & George, 1998). In addition, trust development in negotiations may not be linear (e.g., Van der Werff & Buckley, 2017 in a socialization context) and whether the pattern of trust development is linear or nonlinear may differ significantly for intra- versus intercultural negotiations.

Many scholars conceptualize trust as a multidimensional construct. For example, trust can be calculus- (expected costs and benefits), knowledge- (knowledge of the other party), and/or identity-based (shared values and identity; see Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992, for earlier thoughts on this classification). This conceptualization underscores the qualitative transformation of trust over time, which may be important to negotiations, particularly repeated ones. Notably, McAllister (1995) proposed that cognition-based trust would facilitate affect-based trust, but Chua, Morris, and Ingram (2009) found that the two types of trust were more intertwined for Chinese than for American managers, implying that affect-based trust could precede cognition-based trust in some cultures. If so, would it be possible for negotiators in some cultures to develop identity-based trust prior to calculus-based trust? Also, can negotiators even reach identity-based trust in intercultural negotiations? Will the trust transformation take longer in inter- versus intracultural negotiations? How can we effectively capture trust transformation in intra- and intercultural negotiations? Does the same order of trust transformation (i.e., from calculus-based trust to knowledge-based trust, and ultimately to identity-based trust) apply to intra- and intercultural negotiations?

To address these questions, researchers may need to use qualitative methods (e.g., diary accounts and narratives, critical incident techniques, in-depth interviews, case studies, communication analysis) rather than just quantitative methods (e.g., surveys and experiments) to capture the rich nuances of trust development (Lewicki et al., 2006; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). We can also consider novel methods, such as agent-based simulation (ABS; Grand, Braun, Kuljanin, Kozlowski, & Chao, 2016) and computational modeling (Ilgen & Hulin, 2000), for theory building.

Trust and Distrust

The debate over whether trust and distrust are separate constructs or bipolar opposites (Deutsch, 1958) has regained momentum in the trust literature (Lumineau, 2017; Schoorman et al., 2007). Negotiators' levels of trust and distrust may constantly evolve as the negotiation unfolds, and levels of trust should be particularly dynamic during the negotiation phase in Figure 1. Trust, according to Mayer et al.'s (1995) and Rousseau et al.'s (1998) definitions, refers to an individual's willingness to accept vulnerability based on his or her positive expectation of another individual's intention or conduct. Conversely, distrust, according to Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies's (1998) conceptualization, refers to an individual's

¹We suggest caution for claiming a definitely positive relationship between cultural tightness–looseness and interpersonal trust in negotiations given the inconsistent evidence on this issue (Brett et al., 2017).

willingness to reduce vulnerability based on his or her negative expectation of another individual's intention or conduct. If trust and distrust are separate constructs, then individuals can have (a) high trust and low distrust, (b) high trust and high distrust, (c) low trust and low distrust, and (d) low trust and high distrust. These four psychological states are associated with different emotional and cognitive experiences and behavioral inclinations (Lewicki et al., 1998). If it is theoretically meaningful and empirically feasible to distinguish between trust and distrust in negotiation settings, then negotiators may have confident positive expectations about their counterparts' cooperative or accommodating behaviors and at the same time hold confident negative expectations about their counterparts' competitive or unethical behaviors. These two types of expectations, respectively, may shape negotiators' trust and distrust toward their counterparts. Drawing on Lewicki et al. (1998) model, future research can address questions such as (a) how a negotiator's trust and distrust, if co-existing, jointly affect negotiation processes and outcomes, (b) how a negotiator perceives and attributes trust–distrust ambivalence in negotiations, and (c) how a negotiator's trust and distrust dynamically interact during a negotiation. Answers to such questions can help illuminate the critical roles of trust and distrust in negotiations.

Notably, another stream of trust and distrust research suggests that trust is not necessarily “good” whereas distrust is not necessarily “bad” (Baer et al., 2015; Langfred, 2004; Lewicki et al., 1998). Researchers are beginning to map out the conditions under which trust and distrust lead to positive versus negative outcomes. Although negotiators' trust can help improve their relationships with their counterparts and collective performance, it may cause systematic biases that lead to flawed and suboptimal judgments. For example, negotiators' trust may increase negotiators' vulnerability to their counterparts' deception or betrayal (Olekalns & Smith, 2007, 2009). Olekalns and Smith's (2007, 2009) finding regarding the effect of perceived counterpart trustworthiness on deception may be stronger in face culture that emphasizes indirect confrontation, than in dignity culture that emphasizes direct confrontation, but the consequence of being caught using deception may be even more severe in honor culture (Aslani et al., 2016). This goes back to the fundamental dilemma that negotiators face: How much should negotiators trust the other party? On the one hand, negotiators who distrust their counterparts, due to skepticism and suspicion, may engage in deception (Deutsch, 1958), retaliation, and escalation of conflict (Lewicki, 2007). On the other hand, distrust also can make negotiators wary and alert to their counterparts' behaviors and thus propel them to seek information from their counterparts, which may produce insights and create value for both parties (Lumineau, 2017; Sinaceur, 2010).

The above discussion suggests two foci for trust and distrust research in the future: The first one pertains to how the mix of trust and distrust influences a negotiator's own perceptions, behaviors, and outcomes; the second one pertains to how the mix of a negotiator's trust or distrust influences the other party's perceptions, behaviors, and outcomes. Future studies can choose either approach, or synthesize approaches using an Actor-Partner Independence Model (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006) to concurrently assess intra- and interpersonal effects (Kong, Ho, & Garg, 2018; Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010; Yao et al., 2017). In addition, because cultural differences add more complexity to the understanding of the intra- and interpersonal effects of trust and distrust in intercultural negotiations, before we use the trust–distrust, two-dimensional conceptualization in future research on intercultural negotiations, we should address some fundamental questions: What are the underlying assumptions and theoretical merits of the chosen approach? How can we take advantage of the chosen approach to generate insights that are overlooked by an alternative view on trust? In which cultures can or should we use the chosen approach?

Trust Repair

Trust repair has received some attention during the past two decades. Kim and colleagues conducted a series of studies exploring integrity- versus ability-based trust violations and repair (e.g., Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Their studies shed important light on what steps individuals can take to repair integrity- versus ability-based trust violations. Although in theory

trust violations occur frequently in negotiations due to miscommunication, misaligned goals, or perhaps, it has rarely been a research topic in (comparative) intracultural negotiation settings, not to mention intercultural negotiation settings. Trust repair is very likely to occur during the negotiation phase presented in Figure 1, as inappropriate or questionable behaviors may jeopardize trust and thus call for remedies, but the implication of trust repair goes beyond a single episode of negotiation. Some studies have examined trust repair in bargaining games (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and only recently has research begun to examine trust repair strategies such as apology in negotiations (Lewicki, Polin, & Lount, 2016). The scarcity of research may indicate: (a) Violated trust cannot be repaired in negotiation settings, and thus, it is meaningless to examine trust repair in negotiations, or (b) violated trust can be repaired in negotiation settings, but it is difficult to capture this dynamic with the extant methods. We are inclined toward the latter explanation.

Trust violations may be particularly difficult to resolve when they are a result of intentional rather than unintentional conduct (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). When negotiators engage in behaviors that violate their counterparts' trust intentionally and their counterparts infer such intentionality, it would be difficult for negotiators to repair the damaged trust. However, when the violation is unintentional, which is likely the case in many intercultural negotiations, negotiators may be able to repair the damaged trust, perhaps even to the original level. Thus, we propose that the effectiveness of trust repair may vary significantly between intra- and intercultural negotiations. This prediction needs empirical testing.

In addition to intentionality of trust violations, another reason why trust repair may be difficult, especially in intercultural negotiations, is that culture shapes negotiator cognitions (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). Negotiators subjectively construct the meaning of negotiation contexts (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). Due to their different interpretations of negotiation contexts, negotiators from different cultures are likely to perceive conflict episodes differently when negotiating intra- versus intercultural. For example, American negotiators tend to view a conflict episode as competition and a violation of individual rights or autonomy, whereas Japanese negotiators tend to view a conflict episode as cooperation and a violation of duties and obligations (Gelfand et al., 2001). Such different interpretations of conflict episodes across cultures not only cause trust violations but also make it difficult for negotiators to repair trust.

Also, negotiators from different cultures have different schemas and scripts about self-interest, use of power, and information exchange in negotiations (Adair, Behfar, Olekalns, & Shapiro, 2016; Adair et al., 2001; Brett & Okumura, 1998; Tinsley, 1998). This means that intercultural negotiators may be surprised by their counterparts' negotiation behaviors, interpret such behaviors negatively, and lose trust in their counterparts. Do such trust violations explain why negotiators tend to leave more value on the table in inter- versus intracultural negotiations?

The cultural differences in trust propensity (generalized trust) may also explain the difficulty of trust repair in intercultural negotiations. As Kong's (2013, 2016) research has demonstrated, people from different cultures have different levels of trust propensity (generalized trust), which are predicted distantly by the interplay among climatic, economic, and population-genetic factors and more proximately by Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance. Negotiators from high-trust cultures, due to their general expectations of others' positive intentions and/or conduct, may engage in trusting behaviors and thus be susceptible to trust violations when negotiating with those from low-trust cultures. This is because negotiators from low-trust cultures, due to their preemptive expectations of others' non-positive or even negative intentions and/or conduct, are less inclined to engage in trusting behaviors, such as reciprocating open information sharing, and this disinclination may be perceived negatively, or even be interpreted as a trust violation, by negotiators from high-trust cultures.

Finally, a trust repair strategy that works in intracultural negotiations may not be effective in intercultural negotiations, largely because negotiators may have culturally different interpretations of the strategy. Maddux, Kim, Okumura, and Brett (2011), for example, demonstrated that there is a cultural difference in the function and meaning of an apology, a trust repair strategy that is effective for repairing a competence-based trust violation, but less so for repairing an integrity-based trust violation in the

United States (Kim et al., 2004, 2006). An apology conveys both admission of fault and an expression of repentance to the victim in the United States, but conveys recognition of a burden on the victim and a sense of interconnectedness or indebtedness in Japan (Maddux et al., 2011). This argument is consistent with Gelfand et al.'s (2001) findings that Americans tend to view conflict episodes from the perspective of individual agency whereas Japanese people tend to view conflict episodes from the perspective of social duties and obligations. Maddux et al.'s (2011) comparative study demonstrated that an apology for an integrity-based trust violation repaired trust more effectively in Japan than in the United States, but an apology for a competence-based trust violation repaired trust somewhat more effectively in the United States than in Japan. Their findings suggest that a trust repair strategy should not be assumed to have an equivalent effect across cultures. More cultural nuances should be considered in studies of trust repair in negotiations. This requires not only more comparative-cultural research, but also more intercultural research.

Trust in Virtual Negotiations

Negotiators are using communication technology in both intra- and intercultural negotiations. According to Figure 1, communication technology is relevant to the role that trust plays throughout the three phases of negotiation. However, according to the communication theory of information richness, virtual communication, compared to face-to-face communication, provides less rich information (Daft & Lengel, 1986), creates more misunderstanding, and generates less integrative or satisfying outcomes. Previous research has documented disparate behaviors in face-to-face versus virtual (e.g., e-mail, audio, videoconferencing) negotiations (Rosette, Brett, Barsness, & Lytle, 2012). Virtual negotiations hinder social awareness, a critical factor that can promote prosocial motives in negotiations and hence facilitate trust, cooperation, and reciprocity (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). In addition, virtual negotiations trigger more hostile behaviors (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005), so individuals may encounter more difficulty in effective communication, conflict resolution, and trust building with their counterpart (Lu et al., 2017). Finally, long-distance perceptions stemming from virtual negotiations may not motivate individuals to maintain trust, develop rapport, or remain in a cooperative relationship with their counterpart in the future (Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006). All these features of virtual communication are related to trust and suggest that trust can play a crucial role in explaining the key differences between virtual and face-to-face negotiations, though empirical evidence is scarce.

Culture adds more complexity to virtual intercultural negotiations where virtual communication is largely expected. Individuals in some cultures may be more comfortable and proficient regarding using virtual communication tools for negotiations than those in other cultures. In other words, culture may predict individuals' general attitudes and proficiency levels of using virtual communication tools in negotiations. When negotiators feel more comfortable and proficient regarding virtual (e.g., e-mail) communication in intercultural negotiations, their outcomes are more integrative and satisfying (Geiger & Parlamis, 2014). As Malhotra and Bazerman (2007) noted, one important negotiation principle is to understand and mitigate the counterpart's constraints (e.g., outside forces that limit the counterpart's ability to negotiate effectively). Negotiators who are more comfortable and proficient regarding using virtual communication tools should help their counterparts who are less so to mitigate this constraint, thereby facilitating mutually beneficial and satisfying outcomes. There is certainly a great need for more systematic research that addresses under what circumstances virtual communication is beneficial or detrimental to trust development and negotiation effectiveness in intercultural negotiations.

Also notably, technological innovations may challenge our scientific knowledge of virtual intercultural negotiations and remarkably change how we practice virtual negotiations across cultures. For example, virtual reality may allow negotiators located in different countries to feel like they are negotiating in the same physical space. Simultaneous translation software may allow negotiators who speak different languages to communicate smoothly without time lags. Artificial intelligence may even enable a device to

haggle on behalf of a human negotiator. Incorporating these technological innovations presents promising opportunities to enrich our scientific understanding of trust, culture, and negotiation.

Conclusion

We are living in an increasingly connected world, and we are witnessing and encountering cultural misunderstanding, prejudice, and/or animosity. Trust has never been more important to help us successfully negotiate deals, resolve conflicts, and create value within and across cultures. There are many unanswered questions regarding the meaning of trust, the effects of trust, trust development, trust and distrust, trust repair, and trust in virtual negotiations. We have proposed these six key issues in this article and, for each of them, formulated a number of questions that constitute promising directions for future research. We urge negotiation researchers to commence or continue their work regarding trust and culture, and hope that the insights and ideas offered in this article will inspire such work.

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